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session "Trade and Tax Reform:  Uniformity versus Discretion," January 4-6, 1997. 1. Introduction 
  In recent years, many developing countries have moved away from non-tariff barriers and 
a highly variegated structure of tariffs to a few tariff rates that do not discriminate heavily across 
sectors.  The extreme example is that of Chile which did away with all its quantitative 
restrictions and, with very few exceptions, instituted a single, uniform tariff in the late 1970s.  
During late 1980s, Mexico had replaced virtually all trade restrictions by three tariff rates.  Yet 
another example is Bolivia, which has adhered more or less to a single tariff rate since the early 
1980s. 
  Is the replacement of non-tariff barriers by a single, uniform tariff a good idea?  There are 
two schools of thought on this issue, one led by policy economists and the other by academic 
economists.  Policy economists, frustrated by the complexities of trade policy regimes in most 
developing countries, find the replacement of all trade restrictions by a single uniform tariff as 
the most effective instrument of minimizing trade policy distortions.
1  By contrast, academic 
economists, working in the tradition of optimal tariff and tax literature, rarely think of a uniform 
tariff as a serious policy option.  There are exceptions to this general tendency in both camps but 
they are sufficiently few to merely reinforce the rule.
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1The reference here is to economists at international donor agencies such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund and those working in the governments of many developing countries, 
particularly in Latin America.  These economists have been the primary driving force behind the uniform-
tariff movement. 
     
2Among academic economists, Corden (1958, 1985) and Harberger (1990), both acutely aware of the 
limitations of a uniform tariff as the "optimal" structure, strongly favor it.  In his academic writings, 
Corden (1971, 1974) has systematically shown why tariff uniformity is nonoptimal under most 
circumstances.  Yet, in his policy writings and policy advice, he favors uniformity with strong conviction. 
 In the policy world, economists trained in the tradition of modern optimal taxation theory a la Diamond 
and Mirrlees (1971), have been persistently opposed to tariff uniformity.  For example, see Dahl,   The central purpose of this paper is to explain why policy economists favor a uniform 
tariff regime while academic economists oppose it.  I argue that the differences between the two 
sides are the result of the failure of the latter to appreciate the complexities of policy making in 
developing countries and the advocacy by the former of a uniform tariff for wrong reasons.  
Academic economists rely primarily on theoretical models to show why under most 
circumstances the optimal structure of tariffs is non-uniform but fail to address how this structure 
is to be calculated and implemented in practice.  Policy economists, finding theoretically derived 
optimal structures to be too complex to be of practical value, fall back on the uniform tariff as a 
practical solution to the problem of minimizing distortions. 
  To keep the arguments in sharp focus, it is important to clarify the context of the debate 
at the outset.  Uniform tariffs are usually advocated in the context of a small, open economy.  For 
many developing countries, this is a reasonable assumption.
3  Analytically, the assumption 
allows us to abstract from positive optimal tariffs resulting purely from market power in the 
world markets. 
  In the absence of exogenously specified non-economic objectives or political constraints 
resulting from, say, lobbying, the optimal trade policy for a small open economy is complete free 
trade.  Therefore, any discussion of positive optimal tariffs must presuppose the existence of 
such objectives or constraints.  Two objectives that have played an important role in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Devarajan and van Wijnbergen (1986), Heady and Mitra (1985) and Mitra (1987). 
     
3Obvious exceptions to this are exporters of primary products who have a very large share in the world 




2 academic literature as well as policy discussions are protection and government revenue.  In 
addition, the income distribution objective has received some attention. 
  In principle, trade taxes are rarely the first-best policy instrument.  For example, when 
revenue is the objective, consumption or value added taxes are a superior instrument.
4  The focus 
on trade taxes in this context presupposes that domestic taxes are not available due to an absence 
of collection machinery.  For many African and South Asian countries, this is a realistic 
assumption.  Similarly, when protection is the objective, the superior instrument is a production 
subsidy.  However, due to fiscal considerations, it is not a feasible option in reality.  Because 
tariffs generate revenue while providing protection, in practice, they remain a preferred policy 
instrument. 
2.  Academic Economists' Objections to a Uniform Tariff 
  As already noted, the standard context in which uniform tariffs are advocated is that of a 
small open economy.  It is further assumed that there are constant returns to scale in all sectors 
and no distortions anywhere in the economy.
5  The global optimum in this setting is achieved by 
setting all tariffs uniformly at rate 0, i.e., free trade.  To make the tariff issue substantive, we 
                                                           
     
4In the favorite model of trade theorists and policy makers, factor endowments--capital, labor and 
land--are assumed to be fixed.  In this model, a uniform consumption or value added tax on all 
commodities leaves relative prices entirely undistorted from the world prices.  Therefore, revenue can be 
raised at zero cost; essentially the uniform consumption or value added tax amounts to a lump sum tax.  
Unfortunately, the same cannot be accomplished via trade taxes.  A uniform trade tax on all goods 
amounts to a tax on imports and subsidy on exports (negative imports).  If trade is balanced, the subsidy 
paid on exports exactly offsets the revenue raised on imports.  To raise positive revenue, a uniform trade 
tax cannot be imposed on all trade (including all exports) and relative prices must be distorted. 
     





3 must introduce a noneconomic objective.  We begin with the revenue objective. 
 
2.1  The Revenue Objective 
  Suppose the government wishes to raise a certain amount of revenue through trade taxes. 
  A distortion must now be introduced and global optimum sacrificed.  The issue is what is the 
least distortionary set of trade taxes to raise the specified revenue.  Clearly, tariffs that move the 
economy the least from the free trade equilibrium while raising the required revenue will do the 
trick.  Ignoring cross-price effects, this amounts to taxing imports with low import-demand 
elasticity more heavily and those with high elasticity less heavily.  For each dollar raised in 
revenue, the movement away from the optimum is less for goods with low elasticity than those 
with high elasticity.  Therefore, it makes sense to introduce a proportionately larger tariff 
distortion in the former than in the latter.  This is indeed the essence of the well-known Ramsey 
(1927) result which states that when lump sum taxes are not available, revenue raising taxes 
should be levied in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand.  Because import demand 
elasticities are usually different across commodities, optimal revenue raising tariffs will be non-
uniform.  Cross-price effects only strengthen this point. 
2.2  The Protection Objective 
  Next, consider the protection objective.  If the objective takes the form of protection 
targets by sectors as in infant-industry protection, a uniform tariff cannot be the right instrument. 




4 tariff aims to avoid. 
  The most favorable form of a protection objective for the uniform tariff is to require that 
the overall value added in the domestic import-competing sectors, measured at world prices, be 
above the free trade level.  This objective can be best achieved by a uniform subsidy on value 
added to all sectors.  Such a subsidy creates equal distortion at the margin in all sectors and 
creates no by-product distortions in the economy.  The cost of achieving the objective is 
minimized. 
  As already noted, tariffs are a more convenient instrument of protection because they 
raise revenue while subsidies impose a fiscal burden on the economy.  Proponents of uniform 
tariffs argue that absent subsidies a uniform tariff is the least distortionary instrument for 
achieving the protection objective.  A uniform nominal tariff, applying equally to final goods and 
inputs, results in an equal ad valorem subsidy to value added in import-competing sectors.  In a 
trade theorist's jargon, a uniform tariff leads to equal effective protection across all import-
competing sectors. 
  Opponents of uniform tariffs are quick to point out at least four major problems with 
these plausible-sounding conclusions.  First, if some import-competing sectors use one or more 
exportables or nontradables as inputs, a uniform nominal tariff fails to equalize effective 
protection across sectors.  No tax is paid on exportables and nontradables used as inputs.   
Therefore, a uniform nominal tariff protects the value added in sectors using exportables or 
nontradables as inputs more than in other sectors.  The marginal cost of protection is higher in 




5 added can be reduced by applying a lower nominal tariff on sectors using exportables and 
nontradables as inputs and higher nominal tariff on other sectors.
6 
  Second, if one or more imported inputs are used in some exportables or nontradables, a 
uniform effective rate of protection no longer minimizes the distortion cost of protecting value 
added in import-competing sectors.  In addition to creating the desired distortion, i.e., a uniform 
effective protection in import-competing sectors, the uniform tariff now also distorts production 
in exportable and nontradable sectors using imported inputs.  Lowering the tariffs on inputs used 
in exportables and nontradables and raising them on inputs used exclusively in import-competing 
sectors can reduce the distortion cost.  This will shift the distortion away from where it is not 
desired (exportables and nontradables) towards where it is desired (import-competing goods).
7 
  Third, tariffs distort not merely production but also consumption.  If we assume that no 
imported inputs are used in exportables or nontradables and no exportables and nontradables are 
used in the production of import-competing goods, a uniform nominal tariff will coincide with 
uniform effective protection and, moreover, minimize the distortion in production.  Yet, it will 
not minimize the overall cost of the protection objective.  Since the by-product distortion in 
consumption is not desired, overall protecting the goods with inelastic consumption demand 
more than others can lower distortion costs.  This change will increase the distortion cost in 
production, lower it in consumption, and up to a point lower it overall.  Uniform tariffs--whether 
                                                           
     
6Here and in the following paragraph, we abstract from distortion costs in consumption but turn to 
them soon after. 
     




6 nominal or effective--are non-optimal. 
  Finally, if tariff evasion is possible via smuggling, even if the conditions for a uniform 
nominal tariff to be optimal are satisfied, its adoption will fail to yield the optimum.  Not all 
goods can be smuggled with equal ease: automobiles are far more difficult to hide in a suitcase 
than wristwatches.  A uniform nominal tariff on the books will translate into a non-uniform 
nominal tariff in practice. 
2.3  The Income Distribution Objective 
  For completeness, we may also note the objection to a uniform tariff based on the income 
distribution objective.  Sometimes, tariffs are used to curb the consumption of luxury goods.  In 
this context, the case against a uniform tariff needs no elaboration.  One point to note, however, 
is that a consumption tax on luxury goods may not be as infeasible as a general consumption or 
value added tax.  Therefore, it may often be worth giving serious consideration to a consumption 
tax for income distribution purposes. 
3.  Policy Economists' Justifications for a Uniform Tariff 
  The academic case against a uniform tariff seems impeccable.  How can then uniform 
tariffs be justified?  There are three answers. 
  First, policy economists generally think in terms of the protection objective.  Even in 
situations where they are aware that the objective is revenue, the strong tendency is to focus on 
                                                                                                                                                             




7 protective effects of tariffs.  Furthermore, driven partly by the preferences of the policy makers, 
policy economists are quite willing to ignore the distortion in consumption.  They then 
complement the uniform tariff recommendation with a duty exemption on inputs used in exports. 
 Thus, some of the objections to uniform tariffs as an instrument of achieving the protection 
objective noted in Section 2.2 are overcome.  The remaining objections--nontradables may use 
imported inputs, exportables and nontradables may serve as inputs in import-competing goods, 
and tariff evasion may be non-uniform across commodities--are usually ignored. 
  This justification for uniform tariffs is clearly flawed.  If revenue is the true objective, the 
justification based on protection is wrong.  When protection is the objective, academic 
economists are rarely willing to ignore the distortion in consumption.  The fact that policy 
makers are "protected" from worrying about consumption distortion cannot serve as an 
acceptable excuse for policy economists to ignore it.  An economist's role, in part, is to enlighten 
the policy maker on what is the right policy rather than share in his ignorance or politics.   
Moreover, quite apart from the consumption distortion, the defense is incomplete since it ignores 
several of the objections to the uniform tariff rule. 
  The second justification for a uniform tariff relies on practical difficulties in determining 
the true optimal structure of tariffs.  Policy economists point out that even though in principle 
optimal revenue raising tariffs are non-uniform, in practice, it is impossible to determine them.  
Information on import demand elasticities is notoriously difficult to obtain.  Therefore, the 
chosen tariff structure must involve some arbitrariness.  Once this is admitted, uniform tariffs 




8 other arbitrary tariffs that might get adopted. 
  This justification is potentially plausible.  A key factor in evaluating its validity is to 
assess how much extra distortion do uniform tariffs relative to other tariff structures cause.   
Although some simulations have been done to address this point, we still lack a systematic 
treatment of it.  We need to know how the extra burden varies when there are nontraded goods, 
pure imported inputs used in exportables, importables and nontradables, exportables and 
nontradables that are used as inputs in import-competing goods, etc.  We also need to know 
whether reasonable gains can be made by exploiting whatever information may be available on 
import demand elasticities.  For instance, does the available information allow us to determine a 
limited number of tariff rates, say, two to four, which will involve a significantly smaller loss of 
efficiency than a single rate? 
  A third and final justification for a uniform tariff given by policy economists is 
transparency and administrative simplicity.  A complex tariff structure may be administratively 
frustrating for both customs officials and firms.  Costs of administration may rise with the 
complexity of the tariff code.  A uniform tariff leaves no room for misclassification of goods for 
evasion of tariffs.  Customs officials can concentrate on ensuring that the value of the good is not 
understated; there can be no dispute concerning the rate of tariff to be paid.  These factors can 
help reduce delays in clearing goods for delivery and generate gains especially when goods are 
to be used in the production of exports. 
  There is some truth to this justification.  But logically speaking, it allows us at best to 




9 standard efficiency analysis ignores the costs of administration and delays which accompany a 
complex tariff system.  Once these considerations are taken into account, the number of tariff 
rates will be smaller than what is suggested by efficiency criteria alone.  It is doubtful, however, 
that the number will be one. 
4.  Marrying the Two Approaches: Political-Economy Arguments 
  The discussion up to this point suggests that the case for a uniform tariff is at best weak 
and at worst nonexistent.  This deepens the puzzle why policy economists are at odds with 
academic economists.  I suggest that the answer lies in the fact that the former have not 
articulated their reasons which derive more from the politics of tariff making than conventional 
efficiency considerations. 
  During the past decade, Jagdish Bhagwati and others have repeatedly reminded us that 
we cannot satisfactorily design efficient policies without taking into account political processes 
that influence them.  This is especially true of trade policy.  In many countries, tariffs are greatly 
influenced by either lobbying pressures or the government's desire to favor certain sectors.   
Under such circumstances, tariffs are determined endogenously and the conventional view of the 
government as an omnipotent, social welfare maximizing agent cannot serve as the basis of the 
analysis.  Once this is acknowledged, a tight case in favor of uniform tariff can emerge and has 
indeed been outlined formally in a recent paper by Panagariya and Rodrik (1991).
8 
                                                           
     
8Perhaps at a subconscious level, policy economists are influenced by the phenomena we are about to 




10   The key to understanding the force of a uniform tariff rule is to recognize that it can serve 
as a powerful instrument for restraining the overall level of tariffs.  When tariffs are determined 
by lobbying pressures, their level may depend on the structure.  Therefore, the imposition of a 
constraint on the latter in the form of a uniform tariff rule may constrain the former.  As I argue 
shortly, the adoption of a uniform tariff rule can turn tariffs from a private to a public good.  The 
usual free rider problem appears and lobbying activity is contained. 
  Consider an economy where the government is interested in maximizing the country's 
social welfare as defined conventionally but finds that it is too weak to resist lobbying pressures. 
 Assume that the tariff rate for a sector is determined by the amount of lobbying pressure exerted 
by the latter.  In the absence of a uniform tariff rule, the tariff is a private good for the sector as a 
whole.  Each sector lobbies up to the point where the marginal cost of lobbying equals the 
marginal benefit yielded by the tariff. 
  Suppose now that the government adopts the rule that all tariffs must be the same:  any 
tariff protection granted to one sector will be extended automatically to all the sectors.  This will 
turn the tariff into a public good.  Each sector investing resources into lobbying will find that the 
fruits of its efforts spillover largely to other sectors.  The extent of lobbying will decline 
dramatically.  Indeed, most sectors will choose not to lobby at all and free ride those who do.  
With lobbying curtailed, less resources will be used in a socially wasteful activity and efficiency 
                                                                                                                                                             
is not imposed, lobbying pressures can escalate tariffs and lead to a tariff structure which is all over the 
board.  In the literature, brief, informal discussions of the role of political factors in the choice of a tariff 




11 losses from tariffs will be smaller. 
  At the outset, an important qualification to this argument in favor of a uniform tariff must 
be noted.  In an extreme situation when the economy consists of a few large and many small 
import-competing sectors, the adoption of a uniform tariff rule may lead to a worse outcome than 
in its absence.  The reason is that big sectors may have an incentive to lobby for a high tariff 
despite the free rider problem.  Under the uniform tariff regime, the tariff these sectors are able 
to lobby for is granted automatically to other sectors.  Therefore, it is possible that smaller 
sectors are protected more and that the damage to the economy is greater under a uniform tariff 
regime than in its absence.  It may be argued, however that, in practice, this situation is not very 
likely to arise.  But if it does, a uniform tariff rule will be counter-productive and should not be 
adopted. 
  A related argument in favor of a uniform tariff rule can be made when an enlightened 
government expects a future government to be selectively protectionist, favoring some sectors 
over the others.  In this situation, a uniform tariff rule may be an effective instrument of tying the 
hands of the future protectionist government.  For under a uniform tariff rule, the future 
government must pay a penalty for protecting the favored sectors in terms of protection to other 
sectors.  This, in turn, will reduce the level of protection it will actually choose. 
  Finally, if there are imported inputs which are not produced domestically and are used 
primarily in import-competing sectors, a uniform tariff rule will be accompanied by a lower 
overall effective protection than when protection is differential across sectors.  In the case of 




12 lobbying are greater when there is no threat of a tariff on those inputs.  A uniform tariff rule 
creates this threat and reduces the incentive for lobbying by sectors that use the inputs.  This 
effect is in addition to the free-rider effect discussed in the first model above. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  The case for a uniform tariff based on conventional efficiency criteria is weak.  The best 
one can do is to argue that the damage by a uniform tariff to efficiency will be less in practice 
than when tariffs are allowed to differ across sectors.  There are two aspects of this argument.  
First, the information base may be so bad as to render the task of determining the optimal 
structure of tariffs in a given situation impossible.  Then one must rely on some rule of thumb.  A 
uniform tariff may be one such rule:  it will definitely not be optimal but under most 
circumstances it will do less damage than other sets of tariffs.  Here many economists will 
disagree because there is usually some information which can be used to improve upon the 
uniform tariff.  Second, in practice, because governments are either themselves actively 
interested in protecting certain sectors or too weak to resist lobbying pressures, tariffs will not be 
chosen to maximize social welfare.  In such a situation, a uniform tariff rule can impose a 
discipline on governments and interest groups not available otherwise. 
  A final point to note is that when the primary problem is not lobbying or a future 
government who is going to use trade policy for its own advantage, there is little sense in 




13 ready to allow their favorite exceptions such as a duty drawback on exports and no new tariffs on 
inputs imported freely at the time of reform.  It may simply be wise to adopt a system of two to 
four tariff rates and exploit the available information.  Although the issue is open for further 
research, I will conjecture that up to four tariff rates will be enough to exploit most of the 
efficiency gains without actually reaching the optimum.  A small number of tariff rates will also 
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